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ABSTRACT
This Article sets out a possible trajectory for the co-
evolution of legal responsibility and autonomous machines.
Commentators have responded to the problem of legal
responsibility for harms caused by such machines with already-
existing legal doctrines related to defective products, agency law,
and international humanitarian law, among others. There is a
debate about he extent to which those doctrines in their current
forms can address adequately the situations that will arise when
autonomous machines become ore prevalent. To the extent they
do not, it is because of the law's general discomfort with
associative responsibility, a discomfort shared and informed by
most of the literature on ethics. The ethical literature most relevant
to the problems of associative responsibility provides some
guidance on the issue but no completely satisfactory answers. In
turn, the concern that there will be gaps in responsibility for harms
caused by machines leads to two interweaving lines of
development. The first is to refine the concept of responsibility as
a way to lessen that gap. The second is to reduce harm by designing
autonomous machines with prosocial behaviors. If that second
effort is successful, that very success, together with calls to grant
legal personhood to machines for legal and pragmatic reasons and
the human tendency to anthropomorphize, will strengthen what are
now nascent calls to treat such machines as moral agents. This
trajectory, however, must be placed in the context of society's
current attitudes about how far responsibility in general should
extend.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous machines such as self-driving automobiles and
autonomous weapons systems are no longer a distant prospect, and the
issue of how law can be used to prevent them from doing harm and how
to assign responsibility if they do is more pressing.' This Article plots
a trajectory for the evolution of legal responsibility and decision-making
machines and systems.2 At present, we address the issue with already-
' A recent article from the popular press is Adrienne LaFrance, Can Google 's
Driverless Car Project Survive a Fatal Accident? ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/google-self-driving-car-
crash/471678/http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/google-self-
driving-car-crash/471678/. The first death in a self-driving vehicle occurred on May
7, 2016. See Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, As U.S. Investigates Fatal Tesla Crash,
Company Defends Autopilot System, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016),
http://www.nytines.com/2016/07/13/business/tesla-autopilot-fatal-crash-
investigation.html?_r=0.
2 The Article will assume there will be no upper bound on the sophistication of such
machines. Municipal or international law could limit their development, but their
perceived advantages and the diffuse nature of the threats they pose to most individuals
and societies means such limits are unlikely to be imposed in the near term. Concerns
about negative impacts of autonomous machines are raised most often with regard to
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existing legal doctrines and principles, but the increasing ability of
machines to decide for themselves is leading to the coevolution of legal
norms and of the machines in question. Such developments are taking
place along two parameters and lines of development. One parameter is
the nexus between the machine and human activity. The legal system
is trying as much as possible to associate the actions of autonomous
machines and their consequences to individuals or groups of human
beings, and the doctrines used include individual liability for human
individuals, products liability, agency, joint criminal enterprise, aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, and command responsibility. With
modifications, such doctrines would seem to work relatively well for
less sophisticated machines and more or less so in cases where
sophisticated machines are clearly carrying out the will of human
beings.
However, this is where the second parameter, the degree of
autonomy of the machine as decision-maker, comes into play. The more
autonomy machines achieve, the more tenuous becomes the strategy of
attributing and distributing legal responsibility for their behavior to
human beings. To be sure, there are strict liability doctrines, but in
general, the law is more comfortable with assigning legal iability to
someone when he is personally culpable for a harm and far less so with
liability or guilt by association. In this sense, the law corresponds to
prevailing views of moral responsibility. As machines become more
sophisticated, their actions become less tied to human beings, and the
assignment of legal responsibility to humans for what machines cause
becomes less defensible. Thus, the strengths and weaknesses of specific
proposals such as "use principles of products liability and other tort
doctrines if using nanotechnology in medical treatment harms a patient"
or "apply the principles of command responsibility if an autonomous
weapon 'commits' an act that would constitute a war crime if a human
committed it" depend in part on our comfort with the 'solutions' to the
problem of associational responsibility. Even in cases where such
autonomous weapons. See e.g., Markus Wagner, The Dehumanization of
International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1371 (2014) (discussing
the negative impacts of autonomous weapons on existing law, ethics and politics);
Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-
humanity/case-against-killer-robots (arguing for a ban on autonomous weapons).
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machines are clearly being employed by human beings, some of the
incentives created by legal rules, such as the incentive to take due care,
weaken because humans will be less able to supervise truly autonomous
machines. And since at this point a machine cannot 'feel' legal
sanctions, other purposes of the law, particularly those that motivate
criminal law, are thwarted. As a result, we are forced to become more
comfortable with group legal responsibility or responsibility by
association, or face the prospect of manufacturers, owners or users of
such machines becoming increasingly insulated from the law.
For these reasons, one would expect two things to occur. First,
greater awareness of the permeability of responsibility could make
associational responsibility more acceptable, and alternative forms of
redress or compensation for harm, such as insurance, might be more
emphasized. Second, some scholars urge that autonomous machines be
given legal personhood to satisfy third parties who have been harmed
by them while at the same time avoiding some of the problems raised
by associative responsibility. In the future, we would expect to see
designers try to instill a sense of legal responsibility within the machine
itself. Of course, since as just discussed, machines are not cognizant of
the law, far less do they 'appreciate' or 'value' it, all we can do is
program machines to act as much as possible in conformity to the law,
for example, by instructing autonomous cars to obey traffic laws or an
autonomous weapon to obey the law of war. Of course this development
is possible only to a certain extent: law cannot always be reduced to
rules of decision. Besides, many of the legal issues involving
autonomous machines will be retrospective in nature: we will need to
determine ex post whether a machine's action has legal significance.
Things will vary according to the level of sophistication of the machine
or system, but over the long term, machines at the highest level of
autonomy will need to be programmed in a way so that they are
'motivated' to engage in the kinds of prosocial behaviors the law is
designed to promote. Of course, the case of HAL in 2001: A Space
Odyssey and critiques of Asimov's laws of robotics3 show this can
3 The laws figured as part of Asimov's science fiction Robot series. They are:
A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a
human being to come to harm.
A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law.
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succeed to some extent, but as machines gain those kinds of prosocial
capacities, it will strengthen calls already being sounded to grant
autonomous machines legal and moral rights.
My arguments are set out in four parts. Part II surveys briefly
the issue of autonomous machines and the existing legal approaches that
frame and address the problem. Ultimately, law will need to address
large and complex systems of humans and machines who work together.
However, the law focuses primarily on individual responsibility, which
dovetails with generally accepted understandings of moral
responsibility. Applications of the law to groups still tend to frame the
analysis in individualistic terms. This raises the question whether an
approach designed with the individual in mind is well-suited to address
large systems, because the knottiest issues involving humans and
machines will raise problems of associational responsibility. Part III
discusses the literature of group responsibility because many of its
themes apply to issues of associational responsibility as applied to
humans and machines. While that literature suggests some ways to
address the problem of associational responsibility, ultimately it
underlines how difficult the issue is. Part IV thus discusses the other
route being considered: to instill legal and moral responsibility in the
machines themselves. Part V concludes by putting these matters into a
larger context: the extent to which autonomous machines will impact
our understanding of responsibility will depend on a choice whether to
allow the lines of responsibility to penetrate complex systems.
Throughout, I refer to the literature on the moral responsibility of
autonomous machines because the discussion of machines and
responsibility seems best developed there.
A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.
ISAAC ASIMov, I, ROBOT 42 (Gnome Press ed. 1950). For an evaluation of the three
laws see e.g., Keith Abney, Robotics, Ethical Theory, and Metaethics: A Guide for the
Perplexed, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS
35, 42-44 (Patrick Lin et. al., eds. 2012).
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II. AUTONOMOUS MACHINES AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Issue
In a recent article, Peter Asaro sets out the challenges that
autonomous machines pose to moral theory:
[T]he crucial things we need are theories of punishment,
agency and responsibility that apply to . . . complicated
systems, systems of humans and machines working
together.... Theories in which responsibility and agency
can be meaningfully designed and shared, so that large
organizations of people and machines can produce
desirable results and be held accountable and reformed
when they fail to do so.4
Asaro's challenges are interesting in several respects. First, for the most
part, they appear instrumental in nature. It is a given for Asaro that
autonomous machines will be part of everyday life; hence the need for
theories of punishment, agency and responsibility that will ensure
desirable results from the interaction of humans and machines and
reform when needed. Second, what will eventually have to be addressed
are not individuals primarily, but large, complicated systems or
organizations instead. This reflects a growing reality in which the
machines and systems in question are designed and manufactured by
large organizations or through long supply chains in which sophisticated
machines are already being used and in which such new machines will
operate in systems or organizations of which people are also a part.
Third, Asaro appears to assume machines will reach levels of autonomy
at which it is as appropriate, or perhaps more so, to refer to "humans
and machines working together" and "large organizations of people and
machines," as it is to refer to "humans using machines in their work" or
"large organizations of people who use machines." Asaro poses these
challenges to the field of ethics, but they serve as a way of assessing
how well law meets analogous challenges, and if not, how law might be
changed to do so.
4 Peter M. Asaro, Determinism, Machine Agency, and Responsibility, 2 POLITICA &
SOCIETA 265, 291-92 (2014).
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The way in which law and ethics are being used to address these
challenges follows a pattern of cultural change and development
proposed by J. M. Balkin.5 Balkin argues all aspects of human culture,
ranging from technology to the concepts comprising law and ethics have
tool-like characteristics. Such tools have several features. Cultural
tools are cumulative in that we apply already-existing tools to address
new situations, and they have multiple uses.6 Further, some of the
multiple uses are unforeseen, leading to unexpected consequences, so
that cultural tools take on a life of their own.7 Finally, cultural tools are
recursive: their use leads to new cultural realities that in turn require the
tools involved to be modified to respond to those realities.8 It follows
from these features that cultural tools interact with other tools with the
same effects of multiple uses in different contexts, unintended uses, the
creation of new cultural situations, and recursion.
If Balkin's framework accurately depicts the development of
cultural tools, we would expect societies to approach problems raised
by autonomous machines by using preexisting legal and moral concepts
and doctrines, but we would also expect the application of those tools to
lead to unintended consequences that will in turn lead to modifications
of those concepts of responsibility. The interaction between cultural
tools does not take place in linear fashion, but even now, before the most
sophisticated machines and systems have been manufactured and
deployed, the literature is mapping out lines of development hat fit into
Balkin's framework. There is an interaction between the development
of autonomous machines and the current systems of liability. Some
observers have argued technology is running ahead of the law in this
area, creating new facts on the ground to which law must respond.9
However, it is more accurate to say that designers, programmers,
policymakers, and jurists use the current systems of liability and the
assumptions that underlie them, to frame and address potential legal
issues raised by autonomous machines. In a sense, existing law is
permitting and guiding their development. At he same time, observers
are debating the extent to which this law is sufficient to address
5 J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE (1998) (see in particular ch. 2).
6 Id. at 32.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 UGO PAGALLO, THE LAWS OF ROBOTS 19-20 (2013).
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foreseeable issues. This is leading to speculation about how the law will
need to change and about how future machines will need to be designed.
B. Existing Legal Doctrines
Over the past five years, legal scholars have engaged in
relatively detailed applications of current legal doctrines to problems
that could arise with autonomous machines in the areas of tort, contract,
and the law of war.10 The situations being considered fall into three
broad categories. First, a self-driving vehicle collides with a human and
harms him. Second, a computer program operated by an online business
enters into a contract with a human being where the online business did
not authorize the contract. Third, an autonomous weapons system
capable of selecting its own targets fails to distinguish between civilians
and military personnel. Legal assessments of harms caused by self-
diving vehicles gravitate towards products liability as the likely legal
basis for assigning responsibility, with some discussion of agency law.
Agency law is also the lens through which electronic contracting is
assessed. Finally, the existing doctrines of command responsibility, and
sometimes state responsibility, are applied to harms caused to civilians
by autonomous weapons and systems. This subsection describes briefly
how these areas of the law are being applied.
1. Cars, Contracts, and Weapons
Products. There is a growing literature on liability that could
arise from autonomous vehicles. Gary Marchant and Rachel Lindor
point out since driver error, the major cause of vehicle accidents, will
be largely factored out, liability will focus on the manufacturer and
others involved in the design of the vehicle or those involved with the
infrastructure to support it." Accidents that involve self-driving cars
1o There are several commentators who have outlined the contours of a law of
autonomous machines in the areas of the products liability, crime, contracting, and the
law of war. In particular, see SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL
THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS chs. 2, 4 (2011); PAGALLO, supra
note 9 at chs. 3-5.
" Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous
Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1321, 1327 (2012). For
a recent discussion of the impact this will have on the automobile insurance industry,
see Leslie Scism, Driverless Cars Threaten to Crash Insurers' Earnings, WALL ST. J.
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will thus likely be assessed through products liability law concepts of
design and manufacturing defects and adequate warning and
instruction.12 Some argue products liability law is already capable of
addressing accidents caused by autonomous vehicles.13 To the extent
such concepts become unworkable, some propose strict liability be used
to distribute costs among manufacturers, computer programmers, and
engineers and to enhance insurance schemes.14
It might also be possible to view self-driving cars through an
agency law framework. A self-driving car is not dissimilar to a human
chauffer. If the car causes harm while it is transporting its owner, as
principal, the owner of the car would be responsible since the car would
have caused the damage while within the scope of its agency.s To the
extent a frolic and detour would relieve an owner/passenger from
liability, it would be possible to turn again to the manufacturer as
designing a car capable of acting outside of the scope of its agency
authority.
(July 26, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-cars-threaten-to-crash-
insurers-earnings- 1469542958.
12 Under current products liability law, liability can be found if there are defects in the
design or manufacture of a product or in warnings about he product. Under U.S. law
there are in general two tests whether a design is defective. The first is the consumer
expectations test: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). Under a cost-benefit approach articulated by the Third
Restatement, a design is defective "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe[.]" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
13 Andrea Bertolini argues that current law should be able to adequately address issues
raised by autonomous machines. Andrea Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for
Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules, 5 LAW INNOVATION &
TECH. 214, 222-23 (2007). See also JAMES M. ANDERSON ET. AL., RAND CORP.,
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 118-27 (2014)
(applying existing products liability rules to autonomous vehicles); David C. Vladek,
Machines without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 117, 132-40 (2014) (same).
14 Vladek, supra note 13, at 146.
1 Chopra and White take this approach, although this is supplemented by arguing that
autonomous machines should be given some form of legal agency. See CHOPRA &
WHITE, supra note 10, at 127-35.
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Others, however, are less sure existing law will adequately
compensate persons injured by autonomous machines. For example,
Asaro agrees many of the legal issues raised by such machines will be
covered by products liability rules 16 but fears it will be hard to tell
whether a manufacturer has taken proper care in the design of the
machine.17 Samir Chopra and Laurence White are even less optimistic,
particularly with regard to autonomous systems that are primarily
computer driven. In their view, catastrophic damage caused by systems
embedded in a tangible medium are most likely to lead to recovery
under standard products liability rules. 18 Otherwise, they agree with
Asaro that it will be hard for a plaintiff to meet the burden of showing
that an artificial agent was defective, in part because it will be hard to
show that there was a reasonable alternative design.19 Further, since
some machines and systems must be configured by the user, there will
be arguments that the user has broken the chain of causation that would
lead to liability of the manufacturer or designer.20
Contracts. With regard to contract, Chopra and White suggest
agency law be used to govern issues raised by autonomous contracting.
They note in modem shopping websites, the principal "cannot be said
to have a preexisting 'intention' in respect of a particular contract that
is 'communicated' to the user."21 Instead, "in the case of a human
principal, the principal has knowledge only of the rules the artificial
agent applies."22  In such situations, in Chopra and White's view,
apparent authority could be used to determine whether a principal is
liable for contracts that have completed by the autonomous system.23
16 Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on
Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS
169, 170 (Patrick Lin et. al., eds. 2012) [hereinafter Body to Kick].
17 Body to Kick, supra note 16, at 171.
1 CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 144.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 137, 144. On the other hand, Marchant and Lindor worry that under current
law, manufacturers will be deterred from designing such cars and thus call for
legislative protection or federal preemption to allow their development. See Marchant
& Lindor, supra note 11, at 1330-35, 1337-39.
21 CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 36.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 44. Apparent authority is "the power held by an agent or other actor to affect
a principal's legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes
the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to
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However, they concede certain changes would need to be made to some
existing law because under some sources of agency law, such as the
Restatement Third of Agency, computer programs do not appear to
qualify as agents.24 Ugo Pagallo largely agrees agency concepts best
govern electronic contracting, but he believes they will work less well
in cases of massive economic loss caused, for example, by autonomous
trading systems. 25
Autonomous Weapons. Commentators on the liability of
autonomous weapons systems take a similar approach of applying
existing law. During armed conflict, humanitarian law requires states
distinguish between combatants and civilians and use force
proportionally, the extent necessary to respond to armed force or to
achieve a military objective.26 Current law centers on the responsibility
the principal's manifestation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
Chopra and White argue that apparent authority correctly allocates costs among the
operator, agent, and user. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 47-48. In the case
of the website and check-out, the principal holds out the website as the vehicle through
which the user is able to contract. In most situations, under apparent authority the
principal would be bound by the actions of the electronic agent even though the
principal is unaware of the precise details of the particular contract involved.
However, costs would shift to the user if it is unreasonable for the user to believe such
power exists, for example, when a computer error causes the program to offer a
product at an unrealistically low price. Id.
24 CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 50. The Restatement Third, for example
requires that an agent be a "person." A person is defined as "(a) an individual; (b) an
organization or association that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur
obligations; (c) a government, political subdivision, or instrumentality or entity
created by a government; or (d) any other entity that has legal capacity to possess rights
and incur obligations." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 1.04(5) (2006).
Allowing a computer program or autonomous machine to serve as an agent, would
require the law to confer on machines the legal capacity to possess rights and incur
obligations.
25 PAGALLO, supra note 9, at 99. Pagallo argues in the case of robot traders that the
traditional view of treating a robot as the tool of human beings, and thus attributing
responsibility only to humans, is problematic for three reasons. First, it seems inapt
to describe sophisticated robots needed for large-scale trading as tools. Second,
Pagallo points out that just because a human has delegated some authority to a robot,
it does not necessarily follow that the human is responsible for the robot's actions.
Third, the robots-as-tools approach does not help in the distribution of responsibility
between human beings. Id. Elsewhere, Pagallo argues humans have a claim not to be
financially ruined by the decisions of their robots. Id. at 102.
26 For a discussion of the principles of the law of war, including the principles of
distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, see OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
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of the individual soldier, the officer in the field, and the commanding
officer. Several commentators believe current law is ill-suited to
address a war crime 'committed' by an autonomous weapons ystem.
The weapon itself could not be tried, and it is unclear whether an officer
in the field, let alone the commanding officer, would have the mens rea
required to cause him or her to be liable for a war crime 'committed' by
an autonomous weapon.27  However, this would depend on the
circumstances. An officer that instructs a machine to commit a war
crime would obviously be liable for that crime.28 Further, just as some
commentators contend strict liability should be used with self-driving
cars, some argue that if a superior or commanding officers is not found
liable, the state itself could be found responsible under the international
law of state responsibility. The weapon's actions would be attributed to
the state, since it was deployed as part of a state function.29
2. Laws Related to Groups
Scholars are thus divided in their assessments whether current
law is able to resolve issues of liability that arise in tort, contract, and
international law, and there is a sense in which to resolve the debate,
much of this will need to be worked out through individual cases,
legislation and other forms of governance.30 However, one can go one
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WAR MANUAL 50-69
(June 2015).
27 Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 617, 651-57 (2015); Human Rights Watch, Losing Humanity: The Case Against
Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots
(arguing that it will be difficult to hold military commanders liable for war crimes
committed by robots); Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70-71
(2007).
28 In this regard, Christopher Toscano argues that the existing law of command
responsibility should be enough to hold persons responsible for crimes caused by
autonomous weapons. Christopher P. Toscano, "Friend of Humans": An Argument
for Developing Autonomous Weapon Systems, 8 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 189, 235-
37 (2015).
29 See Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law:
Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT'L L.
STUD. 308, 315-16 (2014).
30 Ugo Pagallo places current scholarship along a spectrum ranging from those who
argue autonomous machines will raise no novel issues of legal responsibility, to those
who argue there will be new forms of responsibility but humans will remain
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step further in this assessment of law. As discussed, Asaro's challenges
are posed to larger systems. However, it is fair to say most legal and
moral theories of responsibility use the individual as the starting point,
and the doctrines and moral principles designed to address larger groups
are ancillary to doctrines primarily addressed to the individual. Of
course, law has always had to do with groups, and a number of legal
doctrines attempt to address groups as such. Products liability law deals
with large enterprises. There are doctrines of aiding and abetting and
joint tortfeasorship. Laws that govern business entities regulate the
components of large groups; subsets of agency, partnership, corporate,
and limited liability law set out rights and responsibilities of the owners
and managers of the firm. In criminal law there is conspiracy in some
domestic legal systems and joint criminality in others and at the
international level. By definition international aw has to do with nation
states. Finally, if Asaro is correct that we should be concerned with
large systems of humans and robots, there is of course the whole of
regulatory law in which legislation and underlying regulations address
almost every aspect of modern societies.
Law therefore does treat large systems. At the same time, when
theories of punishment, agency and responsibility are involved, law
tends to become individualistic in nature, and responsibilities to others
become understood as a set of binary relations, even though those
theories are justified in part by their impacts on the larger society. In
products liability, the manufacturer is of course liable for defective
products, but the manufacturer is itself understood as a unitary whole in
the analysis. In contract law, the focus is on two contract parties, with
some doctrines that address the interests of third parties. Even
corporations and other business entities are understood as individual
actors in their relations with third-party creditors. In criminal law, the
crime of conspiracy is controversial in some legal systems precisely
because it does not sufficiently focus on individual culpability. The
same is true for joint criminal enterprise. In the law of war, the analysis
of war crimes focuses on the actions of individual soldiers and
responsible, and finally to those who argue new forms of legal responsibility will need
to rest on the machines themselves. Ugo Pagallo, What Robots Want: Autonomous
Machines, Codes and New Frontiers of Legal Responsibility, in HUMAN LAW AND
COMPUTER LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, 25 IUS GENTIUM 47, 53 (Mireille
Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer, eds. 2013).
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commanders. On the level of state responsibility in international law,
the state is viewed as a monolithic whole, with little attention paid to the
components of the state. Even in the area of regulation, when
enforcement is involved, the subjects of enforcement tend to focus on
individual subjects or business or political subjects viewed as
individuals. The question becomes whether this emphasis on individual
responsibility poses potential problems for legal systems of
responsibility, agency, and punishment that will need to reach large
systems of humans and machines.
C. The Moral Responsibility of the Individual
I save a final assessment of the law's ability to meet Asaro's
challenge for the conclusion, but here, it is helpful to explore more fully
current views of moral responsibility. The law's emphasis on
individuals when responsibility is involved stems in large part from our
views on ethics.
1. Major Approaches
Responsibility has been defined as "the quality or state of being
responsible,"3 1 and in turn, to be responsible has been defined in part as
"liable to be called on to answer;" "liable to be called to account as the
primary cause, motive, agent;" or "liable for legal review or in case of
fault to penalties."32 These definitions reflect various understandings of
responsibility common in the West. Andrew Eshleman describes the
field33 as beginning with early Greek philosophers who wrestled with
fatalism spurred by the gods' intervention in human affairs. Aristotle's
major work, the Nichomachean Ethics, however, articulates the problem
31 Responsibility Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsibility.
32 Responsible Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/responsible. On the idea that
responsibility entails providing an explanation for oneself, see Andreas Matthias, The
Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata, 6
ETHICS INFO. TECH. 175, 175 (2004) ("When we judge a person responsible for an
action, we mean . . . that a person should be able to offer an explanation of her
intentions and beliefs when asked to do so . . ..").
33 Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. Summer 2014), available at
http://plato. stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.
Vol. 20 VIRGINIAJOURNAL OF LAW & No. 02
TECHNOLOGY
2016 Chinen, The Co-Evolution ofAutonomous 354
Machines and Legal Responsibiiy
in ways still discussed when machines are involved. Aristotle conceives
of responsibility as a person being subject o moral blame or praise for
ones feelings or actions. That in part depends on whether such feelings
or actions are voluntary or involuntary.34 In this regard, Aristotle argues
an action done through ignorance is a form of involuntary action and
thus not subject to moral blame.35 He continues by asserting that an
action is praiseworthy if done through rational choice, chosen as a way
to achieve an end that has been determined through deliberation.36
In Eshleman's view, Aristotle leaves unanswered a question still
being debated: whether a person is subject to praise or blame because
the individual in question herself has merited it, a merit-based view, or
whether individuals are praised or blamed to influence their behavior, a
consequentialist view. 37  This debate intertwines with another
concerning scientific or theological determinism, the idea that all events
are determined by the physical laws of the universe or by an omniscient
and omnipotent God. Incompatibalists believe that if determinism is
true, no one can be morally responsible because one's actions are not
voluntary. In contrast, compatibalists argue a person can be morally
responsible even if important aspects of one's identity and actions are
determined outside of oneself.3 8 Eshleman observes that merit-based
views of responsibility tend towards incompatibalism, whereas
consequentialists tend towards compatibilism. "[P]raising and blaming
could still be an effective means of influencing another's behavior, even
in a deterministic world." 39
Peter Strawson tries to resolve these debates by shifting focus
from the justifications for moral praise or blame to the practice of moral
praise or blame itself.4 0 Strawson argues that in our relationships, we
demand some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who
34 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book III, ch. 1, 37 (330 BCE) (Roger Crisp,
trans & ed. rev. ed. 2014).
35 Id. at 38-39.
36 Id. at chs. 2-3, 40-44.
37 Eshleman, supra note 33.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962),
reprinted in PETER STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1
(Routledge ed., 2008).
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stand in relation to us, and we have certain reactive attitudes, such as
gratitude or resentment, when that demand is either met or thwarted.4 1
Sometimes those reactive attitudes can be suspended when a counterpart
has an excuse, so his behavior is not a violation of the demand for
goodwill, or when the person for some reason is not able to engage in
everyday interpersonal relationships.42 As Eshleman puts it, under this
view, "[w]hereas judgments are true or false and thereby can generate
the need for justification, the desire for good will and those attitudes
generated by it possess no truth value themselves, thereby eliminating
any need for an external justification."43 Thus, one of Strawson's major
contributions is to avoid metaphysical questions by looking at the
community in which judgments are made, a community in which certain
expectations about one's behavior towards one another have been
adopted.4 4 One implication of Strawson's approach is that any system
of responsibility used to address the use of autonomous machines will
necessarily be shaped by the communities in which moral judgments are
made. As will be discussed below, this opens up space for
communities, if they choose, to consider new forms of responsibility to
accommodate machines.
In Eshelman's view, much of the contemporary literature has
been devoted to responding to Strawson's contributions. Several strands
are interesting for purposes of this Article. One is the distinction some
scholars make between types of responsibility. Gary Watson, inspired
by John Dewey, focuses on responsibility as a kind of self-disclosure:
our actions express our commitments, morals, etc.45  This self-
disclosure leaves people open to moral appraisal for the various ends
they choose. As Angela Smith puts it, a person is responsible for
something because "she is connected to it in a way that it can, in
41 Id. at 6-7.
42 Id. at 7-10.
43 Eshleman, supra note 33. For Strawson, such responsibility need not be justified
for their consequentialist effects. "It is far from wrong to emphasize the efficacy of
all those practices which express or manifest our moral attitudes, in regulating
behavior in ways considered desirable . . . . What is wrong is to forget that these
practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral
attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes."
Strawson, supra note 40 at 27.
44 See Philip Pettit & Michael Smith, Freedom in Belief and Desire, 93 J. PHIL. 429,
440-41 (1996).
45 Gary Watson, Two Faces of Responsibility, 24 PHIL. ToPics 227, 227-28 (1996).
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principle, serve as a basis for moral appraisal of that person." 46
Attribution is used to refer to the connection between the person and the
act: "Conduct can be attributable or imputable to an individual as agent
and is open to appraisal that is therefore appraisal of the individual as
adopter of ends."47 This is distinct from holding someone responsible,
usually in the negative sense of blaming that person for something, on
the other.4 8  Fairness issues arise here because holding someone
responsible for something involves such negative consequences and
entails the ability to make demands on that person. Hence, Watson
argues "[i]t is unfair to impose sanctions upon people unless they have
a reasonable opportunity to avoid incurring them."4 9 One result of there
being different kinds of responsibility is that it might be possible to
choose or reconcile various issues that arise from 'harsher' forms of
responsibility by making do with other, less problematic forms.
Finally, some commentators have focused on responsibility as
requiring someone to give an account of her actions or attitudes. Marina
Oshana is one of the proponents of this view. She writes, "[w]hen we
say a person is morally responsible for something, we are essentially
saying that a person did or caused some act (or exhibits some trait or
character) for which it is fitting that she give an account."50 This view
presumes the individual in question meets some requirements of agency,
has performed some act or exhibited a characteristic subject to certain
moral standards, and has fallen short of those standards.5 1 Finally, "the
accountability interpretation assumes the actor possesses and is able to
46 Angela Smith, On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible, 11 J. ETHICS 465,
465-66 (2007).
47 Watson, supra note 45 at 229.
48 As might be expected, various accounts can overlap. For example, R. Jay Wallace
synthesizes Strawson's view of moral responsibility based on the reactive emotions
and Kantian views of the responsibility based on individual autonomy to suggest it is
reasonable to hold a person morally responsible (in the sense of subjecting that person
to certain reactive emotions) if that person is capable of reflective self-control. R. JAY
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 160-61, 226 (1994).
49 Watson, supra note 45 at 237 (emphasis omitted).
5o Marina A.L. Oshana, Ascriptions of Responsibility, 34 AM. PHIL. QTY. 71, 77
(1997).
51 Id.
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exercise certain capacities, rationality, self-awareness, an ability to
appreciate and reply to telling questions, and the like." 52
Despite the differences among these accounts of moral
responsibility, it is striking that each tends to focus on the individual and
makes common assumptions about the persons who are the subject of
moral assessments. The proponents of responsibility as answerability
set out requirements that resonate with those required for Aristotelian
moral praise or blameworthiness: it s fair to hold a person responsible
for her actions if she is aware of the consequences of those acts and
engages in them freely. This set of assumptions would also be consistent
with certain criteria for the 'rules' of interpersonal reactions, because
actions that justify gratitude and resentment depend in part on at least
weak assumptions about the rationality, freedom, etc. of the persons
involved as they live in relationship with each other. Further, scholars
such as Watson and Smith agree that if one moves beyond attribution to
holding someone responsible, some degree of freedom and control over
one circumstances is necessary before sanctions are appropriate.
2. Implications for Autonomous Machines
Autonomous machines raise problems under all such versions of
responsibility. If a machine is simply a tool, the subject of moral
appraisal would obviously focus on the person who used it. A person
who has no control over the actions of an autonomous machine would
normally be absolved of responsibility, just as would a person who had
no control over another person who committed a wrongful act. We tend
to avoid holding a person responsible for the acts of another, even when
there are links such as familial ties between people. Not only are there
arguments that holding a person responsible for what someone else has
done is unfair and unjustified under commonly-held views, it
undermines much of the incentive power law exerts. If an individual
believes she will be held responsible even if someone else primarily is,
she will have little incentive to take care. Or if she is in a position to
52 Id. These versions of responsibility can be mixed. David Shoemaker argues that a
theory of ethics would encompass three understandings of responsibility:
responsibility as attributability, answerability, and accountability. David Shoemaker,
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral
Responsibility, 121 ETHICS 602, 630-31 (2011).
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prevent another person from doing harm, she has less incentive to do so,
since she will be held responsible by association anyway. 53
Under prevailing notions of responsibility, the issue for
autonomous machines becomes if a truly autonomous machine can be
said to be the primary cause of a particular harm, to what extent is it fair
and appropriate to hold human individuals or groups responsible too?
The concern that no one will be legally responsible has, as discussed
earlier, caused some observers to revisit current understandings of
associational responsibility. As Balkin would argue, it is natural to start
with well-accepted doctrines that lend themselves to greater
associational responsibility. Subpart B noted some observers want to
expand strict liability in the area of self-driving cars (which would be
applicable to other civilian uses of autonomous machines, such as
medical applications of nanotechnology) and to state responsibility for
autonomous weapons. Under strict liability, culpability is not taken into
account; it is sufficient that there is some relevant association between
the respondent and the harm, such as the owner of the land in the
paradigmatic Fletcher case. Yet, commentators acknowledge this
approach is problematic exactly because of strict liability's associational
character. David Vladek, for example, argues strict liability should be
applied to the manufacturer of self-driving cars,54 but he concedes this
approach can be unfair to the manufacturer. Hence, he suggests the law
provide a way for manufacturers to seek contributions from suppliers
and computer programmers through a form of common enterprise
liability.55
53 For example, Mark Reiff argues it is counterproductive to hold individuals
responsible for collective action. If an individual believes he will be found liable for
wrongdoing committed by someone else, he will have an incentive to engage in such
wrongdoing and reap its benefits since he can no longer avoid punishment by
refraining from the wrongful act. Mark R. Reiff, Terrorism, Retribution, and
Collective Responsibility, 34 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 209, 242 (2008).
From a law and economics perspective, the imposition of strict liability has the
effect of reducing hazardous activity. If strict liability is imposed against a
manufacturer, it will pass on the costs of liability to consumers, who on the margins
will turn to a cheaper, less dangerous product. The Bridge, Economic Analysis of
Alternative Standards of Liability in Accident Law, LEGAL THEORY: LAW AND
ECONOMICS, https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/LawEcononics/neg-liab.htm.
54 Vladek, supra note 13, at 146.
" Id. at 148-49.
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A common enterprise theory permits the law to impose
joint liability without having to lay bare and grapple with
the details of assigning every aspect of wrongdoing to
one party or another; it is enough that in pursuit of a
common aim the parties engaged in wrongdoing. That
principle could be engrafted onto a new, strict liability
regime to address the harms that may be visited on
humans by intelligent autonomous machines when it is
impossible or impracticable to assign fault to a specific
person. 56
Under this approach, it would be unnecessary to find direct links
between a computer designer or a manufacturer and the autonomous
machine that was more directly involved in an accident. Since each
participant was part of a common enterprise, it is reasonable to distribute
responsibility to each participant. This argument, however, is not
uncontroversial because Vladek's joint liability approach extends the
reach of associational iability even further.
Vladek's recommendations echo more comprehensive
approaches. In 2010, a working group of scholars produced a set of five
principles or rules governing moral responsibility for computing
artifacts.57 Rule 2 reads:
The shared responsibility of computing artifacts is not a
zero-sum game. The responsibility of an individual is not
reduced simply because more people become involved in
designing, developing, deploying or using the artifact.
Instead, a person's responsibility includes being
answerable for the behaviors of the artifact and for the
artifact's effects after deployment, to the degree to which
these effects are reasonably foreseeable by that person.5 8
A rule like this would be needed to reach the members of large groups
of programmers and engineers who will contribute to the design and
56 Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
57 Keith W. Miller, Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts: "The Rules ", 13 IT
PROFESSIONAL 57, 57 (May/June 2011). Versions of the rules and commentary are
available at https://edocs.uis.edu/kmill2/www/TheRules/.
51Id. at 58.
Vol. 20 VIRGINIAJOURNAL OF LAW & No. 02
TECHNOLOGY
2016 Chinen, The Co-Evolution ofAutonomous 360
Machines and Legal Responsibiiy
manufacture of intelligent machines and human members of groups who
use them. Rules like this present some challenges, particularly given
the realities of computer design. Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen
write:
Given the complexity of modern computers, engineers
commonly discover that they cannot predict how a
system will act in a new situation. Hundreds of
engineers contribute to the design of each machine.
Different companies, research centers and design teams
work on individual hardware and software components
that make up the final product. The modular design of a
computer system can mean that no single person or
group can fully grasp the way the system will interact
with or respond to a complex flow of new inputs.59
In this passage, Wallach and Allen use the design process to show how
difficult it is to say that any one designer could foresee what a computer
driven device would do in the future. In addition to the fact that the
design process above seems to undermine the possibility that the effects
of such artifacts will be reasonably foreseeable, such a rule expands the
scope of responsibility in controversial ways, as I discuss below.
3. Autonomy and Agency
Because law and moral theory emphasizes individual
culpability, current law fits best when the 'actions' of machines can be
closely associated with humans, either because the machine is so
unsophisticated that it can be understood as merely a tool or, in the case
of sophisticated machines, as acting on behalf of a human principal.
With regard to the machine as tool, at this point, it is difficult to imagine
a machine that truly acts on its own. Autonomous machines fall within
a range of lesser or greater autonomy and pose corresponding challenges
to legal responsibility. The less sophisticated a machine is, the more
appropriate it is to focus on the individual human or group of humans
who used it, and any harm caused by such a tool is readily attributable
to its users. It is unproblematic to say "he damaged his neighbor's
59 WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS
RIGHT FROM WRONG 39 (2010).
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bushes with the pruning shears," thus attributing responsibility for the
damage to the person who wielded the tool.
Further, by their very nature, autonomous machines and systems
are being developed for use by human beings. The more the actions of
autonomous machines can be associated with humans, the easier it is for
the existing law of products liability, agency law, joint criminal
enterprise, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and command responsibility
to respond to harm caused by those machines. If a completely
autonomous machine is designed for and used or directed by human
beings to achieve a particular end, it seems relatively straightforward to
distribute liability for harms caused by that machine to the human or
collection of humans who are associated with it.
The problem of legal responsibility and autonomous machines
is thus ameliorated to the extent even fully autonomous machines can
be characterized as designed for and used by human beings; legal
responsibility for harm caused by a such machine can eventually be
distributed to a human individual or to a collection of human beings who
employ them. However, that claim is not absolute: it can be argued that
the sophistication of a machine does impact legal liability and stretches
current conceptions of that liability. Put in terms of agency law, a
completely autonomous machine would be capable of engaging in the
frolic and detour alluded to earlier, an action not readily attributable to
the human being that would be associated with it. Peter Sparrow, who
is concerned with the moral responsibility of autonomous machines,
writes as follows:
[A]utonomy and moral responsibility go hand in hand.
To say of an agent that they are autonomous is to say that
their actions originate in them and reflect their ends.
Furthermore, in a fully autonomous agent, these ends are
ends that they have themselves, in some sense, chosen.
Their ends result from the exercise of their capacity to
reason on the basis of their own past experience. In both
of these things, they are to be contrasted with an agent
whose actions are determined, either by their own nature,
or by the ends of others. Where an agent acts
autonomously, then, it is not possible to hold anyone else
responsible for its actions. In so far as the agent's actions
were its own and stemmed from its own ends, others
cannot be held responsible for them. Conversely, if we
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hold anyone else responsible for the actions of an agent,
we must hold that, in relation to those acts at least, they
were not autonomous.60
Sparrow is agnostic whether machines will ever achieve the highest
levels of autonomy such that they are acting for themselves. However,
he argues that the more autonomous those machines are, "the less it
seems that those who program or design them, or those who order them
into action, should be held responsible for their actions."61
Sparrow is concerned with who will be morally responsible for
the actions of autonomous weapons systems, and his worry that no one
will be responsible leads him to conclude it would be unethical to use
them.62 Others disagree with Sparrow,6 3 but even if he is right as to the
60 Sparrow, supra note 27, at 65-66.
61 Id. at 66. Bertolini shares similar doubts that machines will achieve what she calls
"strong autonomy." Bertolini, supra note 13, at 222-23. Andreas Matthias shares this
concern. He argues
[T]here is an increasing class of machine actions, where the traditional ways
of responsibility ascription are not compatible with our sense of justice and
the moral framework of society because nobody has enough control over the
machine's actions to be able to assume the responsibility for them.
Matthias, supra note 32, at 177.
62 Sparrow, supra note 27, at 66. See also Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of
Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 787 (2012) (arguing
that autonomous weapons should be banned because it will be difficult to hold human
beings responsible for crimes caused by such weapons).
63 For example, Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman argue such reasoning seems
particularly persuasive to those who have faith in ability of the laws of war and
individual criminal liability to enforce compliance. They argue other mechanisms can
be used to encourage such compliance and worry that holding individuals criminally
liable for the use of autonomous weapons could have a chilling effect on the
development of systems that might reduce harm to civilians. Kenneth Anderson &
Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethicsfor Robot Soldiers, POL'Y REV., Dec. 2012 & Jan.
2013, at 35, 43. In this regard Toscano believes autonomous machines will be better
than human beings at complying with the law of war while in
combat. Toscano, supra note 28, at 224-42. In particular, he argues in the near term,
since human beings will remain in the loop when autonomous weapons are used,
existing civil and criminal liability mechanisms should be sufficient to address specific
incidents involving such weapons. Id. at 235. Further, Toscano suggests such
systems could actually enhance command responsibility because they constantly
record data that could be used in investigations of any incidents. Id. at 238.
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ethics of using such machines, his arguments are not necessarily
applicable to legal responsibility. In an environment in which as a legal
matter all things are permitted unless expressly prohibited, if a
programmer, designer, or 'supervisor' of a machine cannot be held
legally responsible for an autonomous machine's actions, it does not
follow it would be illegal to program, design, or use it. Of course this
exacerbates the issue because there might be machine-caused harms for
which no one is legally accountable.
The lack of legal responsibility is worrisome for several reasons.
From a purely instrumental perspective, one reason for developing
autonomous machines i that they will achieve benefits human beings
cannot realize alone. Eventually, self-driving cars will be safer than cars
driven by humans, and although several observers argue strongly this
will never be so, in theory autonomous weapons systems could
eventually reduce the number of deaths caused in battle.64 However, if
designers, programmers, manufacturers, and officers are insulated from
legal responsibility, the costs of harms caused by machines are shifted
to consumers and civilians. Lack of such responsibility removes an
incentive for designers, programmers, and manufacturers to avoid
producing machines that pose an unreasonable risk. In the case of
military applications, the failure to hold someone responsible could lead
to impunity, with the result there would be little incentive to design
machines and deploy them in ways that comply with the law of war.
The concern is law will find itself at an impasse. On the one
hand, even machines that do not reach high levels of autonomy might
still act in such a way that is hard under our current conceptions of legal
responsibility to associate the machine's 'actions' with a human so that
he or she could be held responsible legally for what the machine has
done. On the other hand, such a machine is still without a "soul to be
damned or a body to be kicked" so that it seems unsatisfactory and
pointless to hold the machine responsible for itself. There appear to be
two ways through the impasse. The first is to refine or redefine our
understanding of associational responsibility. The second is to explore
64 Toscano, supra note 28. Toscano argues autonomous weapons systems will be
better than humans in reducing civilian casualties because they can remain objective,
can act with greater caution, and can exceed human beings' biological limitations. Id.
at 224-34.
Vol. 20 VIRGINIAJOURNAL OF LAW & No. 02
TECHNOLOGY
2016 Chinen, The Co-Evolution ofAutonomous 364
Machines and Legal Responsibiiy
the extent to which the machine itself can be deemed to bear legal rights
and responsibilities. I consider each direction in turn.
III. ASSOCIATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Literature of Group Responsibility
Rule 2 discussed above expands the responsibility of the
designers, manufacturers, and users of autonomous machines. It is
worth assessing such extensions under current ethical norms. The issues
raised by associational liability are the subject of much of the literature
of group responsibility. The field focuses generally on four interrelated
problems. 65 The first relates to the question whether anyone beyond the
human individual can be subject to responsibility. More precisely, the
issue is whether a collective as such is capable of being subject o moral
evaluation or whether, such an evaluation is really aimed at its members,
since a group can only act through those members. Second, if in theory
a collective can be subject to such judgment, are all groups susceptible
to responsibility or are only certain kinds of collectives, such as
corporations, morally answerable, while others, for example the crowd
at a sporting event, are not? Third, when is it appropriate to distribute
responsibility of a group to the members of the group? Finally, as a
practical matter, even if a collective is morally responsible for some
wrongful act and there are grounds for finding members in a collective
responsible as well, what consequences hould follow, particularly
when those consequences will be felt by members, not the collective
itself?
1. The Moral Responsibility of Groups as Such
All four questions have implications for the responsibility of
autonomous machines, not only because in many instances, autonomous
machines will be used in connection with groups, such as
manufacturers, a supply chain, a military, or a government, but also
because similar questions arise if the question involves a "group" of
two: one human person and an autonomous machine working together
65 Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. Summer 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/.
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causes harm. The question whether a group itself can be morally
accountable involves an ontological or conceptual decision whether a
group exists in and of itself as more than the sum of its parts or whether
at base the group is shorthand for the actions of individual members.66
In a sense, law has already answered this question: groups such as
corporations and nation states are capable of incurring legal obligations
and duties as such. However, the issue persists in other forms. The
debate in corporate law between Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means on
the one hand, who argue that the corporation should be understood as
an entity of itself, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling on the
other, who view the corporation as a nexus of contracts between and
among its constituents, is one manifestation of the larger issue.67 In
some cases, the legal assumption that groups can be held legally
responsible means that assigning responsibility to a group for what an
66 For example, David Copp believes under some circumstances, a group can be found
to be morally responsible for an action or outcome even though its members are not.
David Copp, The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis, 38 J. Soc. PHIL. 369 (2007).
Sometimes the analysis turns on whether a group meets criteria for holding a human
agent responsible. J. Angelo Corlett argues that some groups can be said to have an
intention, act voluntarily, and have knowledge of the possible results of their actions
so that the group can be morally responsible. J. Angelo Corlett, Collective Moral
Responsibility, 32 J. Soc. PHIL. 573, 575 (2001). See also Philip Pettit, Responsibility
Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007) (arguing that certain groups meet criteria for
being held morally responsible).
On the other hand, Colin Wight argues although the state is recognized as a legal
subject, it is not in itself capable of independent action and should not be treated as a
person for moral evaluation. Colin Wight, State Agency: SocialAction without Human
Activity?, 30 REV. INT'L STUD. 269, 278 (2004). For Wight, even though the state does
have structures and causal powers that facilitate collective action, "such causal power
that does emerge can only be accessed by individuals acting in cooperation with
others." Colin Wight, They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They? Locating Agency in the
Agent-Structure Problematique, 5 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 109, 128 (1999). See also John
Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen When we Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and
the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J. L. & POL. 55 (2010) (arguing that the
corporation cannot bear moral responsibility because it is a legal fiction); Pekka
Miikelii, Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility, 38 J. Soc. PHIL. 456 (2007)
(arguing against collective responsibility).
67 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 353-57 (1933); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The question whether corporations can commit crimes is
another example of this issue. For a discussion, see Edward B. Diskant, Comparative
Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Though
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L. J. 126 (2008).
Vol. 20 VIRGINIAJOURNAL OF LAW & No. 02
TECHNOLOGY
2016 Chinen, The Co-Evolution ofAutonomous 366
Machines and Legal Responsibiiy
autonomous machine does will not be a major leap in development,
provided the machine can be said to belong to or is owned by the group.
For example, it would not seem uncontroversial to hold a state
responsible for harm caused by a robot weapon because such a weapon
would be the property of the state. However, as discussed below, law's
ability to hold groups legally responsible does not resolve all issues.
2. Types of Collectives
With regard to the question of what kind of collectives can be
held morally responsible as such, several ethicists argue that long-lived
groups with centralized decision-making systems and structures, such
as an army or a corporation, can be subject to moral evaluation because
those structures enable such groups to "think" and "plan" and to form
and pursue goals, whereas more amorphous collectives like spectators
at a sporting event or patrons in a restaurant should not be subject to
moral evaluation. If some harm occurs at such an event or at the
restaurant, individual spectators or customers will be evaluated, not the
"group" itself. Other scholars propose an intermediate step that holds
individuals subject to moral responsibility as members of teams. Ian
Lee suggests
[W]e think of a collectivity as being constituted and
maintained by the self-identification of its members with
the group. In this definition, the key concept is neither
the group's identity nor its institutional features but the
fact that its members regard themselves as the members
of a collectivity. Collectivities are not quasi-persons, but
teams. 68
For Lee, a team exists when "its members regard themselves as the
members of a team and adopt collectively rational principles as
principles of action."69 A team member can be held responsible for the
actions of other team members because he or she has contributed to the
goals of the team (thus having some degree of culpability), even though
he or she was not directly involved in the harm caused by a team through
one of his or her other teammates. Lee feels it is also appropriate to
68 Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility, 31
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 755, 772 (2011).
69 Id.
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condemn the team as such over and above its members. He argues,
"[c]ondemnation of the team draws attention to the contributory role
that the team's norms played in producing the wrongdoing and to the
responsibility of the member in relation to the content of those norms."70
This condemnation is important because focusing only on the individual
in effect absolves the team, with no impact on the team norms and
structures that contributed to the harm.7 1
In the case of autonomous machines, principles like these would
be useful in determining when it is appropriate to spread liability among
a wider group of human 'participants,' such as among manufacturers,
software programmers, and engineers in the case of autonomous
vehicles, as Vladek proposes. Team concepts like those suggested by
Lee would make it possible to hold looser associations of individuals or
groups responsible for harms caused by autonomous machines. This
conception would encompass the associations themselves and the
members of the team. However, the issue of which kinds of groups can
be subject to responsibility never completely disappears. Concepts like
teams that allow looser affiliations of individuals to be held responsible
simply raise the issue to another level. This is because whether there
are enough coherent norms and structures in a collective to constitute a
team will always be subject to debate. One can imagine for example
some arguing that the contractual relations used to define the rights and
duties of a production team allow us to characterize the loose affiliation
as a team. Others however would argue that those 'norms' are too thin
to create a common ethos and set of goals that one associates with sports
teams.
3. The Distribution of Responsibility from a Group
to its Members
As just discussed, the approaches taken by scholars of group
moral responsibility to the first and second questions of whether and
what kinds of groups might be candidates for moral evaluation and
judgment are relevant to the responsibility of autonomous machines.
70 Id. at 778.
71 See Id. Amy Sepinwall also uses team ethics to argue it is appropriate for corporate
officials to be held morally responsible for crimes committed by corporations. Amy
J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries ofResponsibility in the Face
of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 411, 435-45 (2011).
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However, the third and fourth questions appear to be the most germane
to the issue of autonomous machines and associational responsibility.
Recall that the third question is whether and under what circumstances
the liability of a group can be distributed to its members. The literature
tends to agree that since "judgments about the moral responsibility of [a
collective's] members are not logically derivable from judgments about
the moral responsibility of a collectivity," 72 there must be some
culpability on an individual's part before moral judgments about the
collective can be transferred to her. Several grounds have been raised
in this regard. Some ethicists argue that if a member shares the
objectives of a group, it is appropriate she share responsibility for the
group's actions to further them. As discussed earlier, shared goals are
part of the basis for holding team members responsible for the actions
of other teammates. Another approach focuses on shared benefits
instead of shared goals: if a member benefits from the group it is fair
that she share its burdens, including responsibility for harms committed
by the group or other group members.
These approaches resonate with some of the directions the law
has already taken, as discussed earlier. With regard to shared goals, it
seems sensible that if manufacturers, software developers, and
engineers share a common goal of producing an autonomous machine,
it is not unfair to find them liable for harms caused by that machine.
Similarly, since these people have benefited from the sale of such
machines, it is appropriate they share any costs incurred by them. The
shared goals and benefits approach does not necessarily require the
individuals among whom responsibility is distributed be part of a
particular kind of group, so long as there are goals and benefits common
among the individuals involved. Shared goals and benefits also provide
some of the moral underpinnings of agency law. Normally, the principal
and agent share the same aims and both benefit from their relationship
so that as a general matter, it seems appropriate that they share legal
responsibility for the agent's actions. Thus, even though it is likely
under current tort law that the manufacturer, and by extension, the
software developer and the engineer, will be the primary focus of
72 Virginia Held, Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?,
67 J. PHIL. 471, 475 (1970).
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attention, it could also be argued the owner/passenger of an autonomous
vehicle should also bear some responsibility since he or she has
employed the vehicle for his or her benefit.
At the same time, this last example reveals a limitation to the
shared goal or benefit approach to associational responsibility. The
approach makes everal assumptions. One assumption is the very fact
that sharing a goal becomes a predicate for responsibility. However,
this situation is not always the case. It seems justified, for example, in
the case of conspiracy, if everyone shares the same purpose of
committing a crime to hold each member responsible for that crime
(provided there is an actus reas). However, this assignment of
responsibility is less obvious if the goal is not prohibited. The
manufacturer, software developer, and engineer share the goal of
creating an autonomous machine, but that goal is desirable. They
certainly do not work together for the purpose of causing harm. If,
however, they did not intend to cause harm, why should they be held
responsible for that harm? Of course, it could be said tort law avoids
the need to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate goals by
employing concepts of foreseeability: vague concepts like intent and the
appropriateness of goals can be sidestepped because it is enough that
people foresee their activities could cause harm. This approach is the
impulse that informs Rule 2 discussed earlier.73 However, we have now
moved beyond a common goal approach.
Another issue with the common goal approach is it can ignore
differences between a goal and the means to achieve it. Soldiers might
share the same objective yet disagree about he means to fulfill a
particular mission. Under current understandings of liability, that one
solider commits a war crime is not imputed to fellow soldiers even
though their primary goals are the same. It appears we must return to
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate ends and legitimate
and illegitimate means,with the result that shared goals alone do not
necessary justify associative responsibility.
7 One of the issues raised by a foreseeability approach is since many things are
foreseeable, the judgment that a risk was foreseeable is really a judgment about who
should bear that risk.
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Difficulties also arise if one uses shared benefits as a basis for
associational responsibility. As discussed above, there is a sense in
which people who share benefits from an activity should be responsible
for costs incurred by it. However, as Reiff points out, benefits are not
shared evenly among members of a group.74 Further, he argues, receipt
of a benefit is a different wrong than the original wrong.75 These
difficulties lead to two consequences. A benefit-based system of
responsibility would require a method to apportion responsibility
according to the amount of benefit received by a member. This
apportionment might be possible in some cases but not in others. It
might be that a benefit comes from a number of sources that cross group
boundaries, thus making it hard to use a group-member, benefit-burden
schema. Further, the difference between an original wrong and the
benefit received raises several sub-issues. As Richard Vernon points
out, one is the concern that any costs of sanctions for the original wrong
will be disproportionate to any such benefit. 76 Moreover, it is not
always the case that a person who receives benefits should share costs;
for example, although citizens of a state certainly benefit from it, certain
vulnerable individuals are protected with no expectation of return.77 it
thus appears that although there are certain justifications for distributing
moral responsibility from group to member, no one justification is
completely satisfactory.
4. The 'Pragmatics' of Group Responsibility
The question of consequences, the fourth major area of concern
in the group responsibility literature, is conceptual and pragmatic.
Much of this concern has been alluded to earlier. Whether a group itself
should suffer consequences for a wrong depends in part on the purposes
of moral sanctions and whether such consequences serve them.
Sanctions are used for retribution, societal condemnation, or to deter
future wrongs. Determining which purpose should be served and
74 See Reiff, supra note 53, at 218-19.
75 Id. at 219.
76 Richard Vernon, Punishing Collectives: States or Nations?, in ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 287, 300 (Tracy Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011)
(citing Richard Vernon, States of Risk: Should Cosmopolitans Favor Their
Compatriots?, 21 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF. 451, 451-69 (2007)).
77 Id. (citing Robert Goodin, What is So Special About Our Fellow-Countrymen?, 98
ETHICS 663, 663-86 (1988).
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whether a particular sanction will be effective in furthering it is hard
enough in the case of individuals but becomes harder still when groups
are involved: first, the group "has no soul to be damned and no body to
be kicked," and second, those negative consequences often devolve to
group members. The result can be seen as a balancing of the objectives
of group sanctions with the fairness of distributing those sanctions
downwards. It follows that the type of group sanction or the specific
consequence might be relevant to whether they should devolve to the
members of the group. For example, Avia Pasternak distinguishes
between punishment and liability. She argues that it would be
inappropriate to punish members for the wrongdoing of the group itself
because for her, punishment is an expression of anger and moral
judgment that should not be directed to individuals unless they are
personally culpable.78  However, Pasternak feels it is appropriate to
distribute liability to members because liability does not carry the same
sense of condemnation that punishment carries.79 Although liability
also imposes costs on members, it is not based on personal culpability;
78 See Avia Pasternak, The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 210, 212-16 (Richard Vernon &
Tracy Isaacs eds., 2011). As Pasternak puts it, "[w]hen the group itself is the agent that
behaves wrongly but its members are the ones who end up being condemned, then the
necessary connection between responsibility and punishment . . . is broken." Id. at
216.
7 9Id. at 216-18. Pasternak's distinction between the respective bases for sanctions and
liability raises the issue whether guilt by association under criminal law can be equated
with being forced to pay the costs of state responsibility. It could be argued that they
are distinct. Criminal sanctions can be severe and carry with them a strong sense of
moral condemnation, hence the requirement for a particular mens rea and a heightened
standard of proof. That distinction is not necessarily true for the commission of an
internationally wrongful act. At the same time, the problems are analytically the same.
Whether a state can commit a crime with the required mens rea, etc. is a subset of the
question whether groups can be subject to responsibility. It is the same type of
question as whether a state can commit a wrongful act. Assuming the answers to those
questions are yes, the distributive questions are also similar. As discussed, we
normally think that a person who bears the legal consequences of an act of another,
whether criminal or not, must also be culpable to some extent. If a citizen bears
criminal or civil sanctions for something committed by the state without such
culpability, it is legal guilt or liability by association. International law could ground
responsibility more on the fact that an injury has occurred and less on the fact a wrong
has been committed. As is true in the area of transitional justice, this conception raises
another kind of distributional problem: why citizens who are not responsible for a
harm should be required to address it. Id. at 216 (citing Anthony Flew, The
Justification ofPunishment, 29 PHILOSOPHY 291, 293 (1954)).
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rather, it is based on the need to pay for the costs incurred when the
law is broken and to compensate victims for harms. 80
5. Summary
The issues addressed by the group responsibility literature
resonate with the concerns of this Article. Part IV discusses technical
and conceptual efforts to hold machines themselves liable for harms, but
at this point in their development, autonomous machines resemble
groups because they too have no souls or bodies that make them
sensitive to moral condemnation or legal consequences. Earlier in this
Article,81 I discussed the concerns about impunity if no one is held
responsible for harms caused by autonomous machines, creating the
impulse to spread that responsibility. However, if we say a machine is
primarily responsible for harm, to widen the circle of responsibility
further to reach humans will mean distributing responsibility to others
less culpable. As I have just argued, current justifications for the
distribution of responsibility are never completely satisfactory. Either
outcome, impunity on the one hand or responsibility by association on
the other, seems undesirable.
B. Revisiting the Concept of Responsibility
Subpart A's review of the literature on group moral
responsibility seems to jibe well with the law's current system of
associational responsibility, but at the same time, it highlights some of
the tensions within that system. Some commentators have tried to
resolve these tensions by trying to alter responsibility in ways that better
respond to the issues posed by autonomous machines.
1. A Shift in Emphasis to the Victim or Survivor of
Harms or the Harm Itself
As discussed, the standard account of responsibility starts with
the human individual, who sets goals for herself, acts freely to reach
them, and is aware of the consequences of her actions. Departures from
this standard view tend to take two directions. One direction is to shift
s 0 Id. at 213.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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attention from the perpetrator of harm to the victim or survivor, or to the
harm itself. This view draws from the moral principle that one should
help someone who has been injured. Such a focus on the victim or
survivor or on the harm itself has its merits. It justifies spreading costs
among a wider group of people or throughout society as a whole without
the need for any culpability of those asked to share the costs of the harm.
Thus, one can imagine no-fault public or private insurance schemes that
would compensate for damage to property or persons caused by
autonomous machines. This option would have the benefit of pooling
risk.82 Similarly, as discussed earlier, a system of strict liability could
spread liability costs among consumers that would cause them to choose
less hazardous activities.
At the same time, this shift in emphasis raises other issues. Peter
Singer has argued persuasively that a person who, without harm to
himself, can assist another person has a moral duty to do so.83 However,
this claim is not uncontroversial. The fact that someone has been injured
might serve as grounds for redress, but it does not fully answer why
someone who has not caused the injury should provide it. Further, even
if one accepts that an injury itself justifies a shared response, the
question of how the costs of the injury should be shared remains, which
raises its own issues of fairness. Pasternak argues in this regard there
are three ways to distribute these costs: proportionally, equally, or
randomly.84 She points out distribution on a proportional basis is the
most fair but sometimes hard to implement. A random distribution is
the easiest to implement but the least fair. Therefore, an equal
distribution of costs seems the most appropriate.8 5 At the same time,
even an equal distribution of costs requires some justification. In the
case of the nation state, Pasternak suggests that citizens should accept
an equal distribution of costs incurred when their government causes
harm "because doing so is constitutive of a certain ethical understanding
of the meaning of citizenship."86 One can agree with Pasternak's view
of citizenship or not, but this approach indicates that equal sharing does
82 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Meier & Robert M. La Follette, The Policy Impact ofNo-Fault
Automobile Insurance, 6 POL'Y STUD. REV. 496, 502 (1987) (finding that no-fault
insurance systems resulted in lower premiums to drivers).
83 Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972).
84 Pasternak, supra note 78, at 212.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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not serve as its own justification; it is a compromise. Further, as is well
known, insurance schemes tend to raise the problem of the moral
hazard.87 Finally, a no-fault system of compensation could reduce the
benefits for victims that come from holding someone responsible for the
harm.8 8
8 See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REv. 941, 961 (1963). The concern is that insurance will encourage people
to take on more risk. On the moral implications of the moral hazard, see, e.g., Will
Braynen, Moral Dimensions of Moral Hazards, 26 UTILITAs 34 (2013); Rutger
Claassen, Financial Crisis and the Ethics ofMoral Hazard, 41 Soc. THEORY & PRAC.
527 (2015).
" In this regard, the literature suggests people who have access to compensation after
an injury actually have worse health outcomes than those who do not have such access.
Jason Thomson et al., Attributions of Responsibility and Recovery Within a No-Fault
Insurance Compensation System, 59 REHABILITATION PSYCH. 247, 248 (2014) (citing
Edward B. Blanchard et al., Effects of Litigation Settlements on Posttraumatic Stress
Symptoms in Motor Vehicle Accident Survivors, 11 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 337, 337-
54 (1998); Belinda J. Gabbe et al., The Relation Between Compensable Status and
Long-term Patient Outcomes Following Orthopaedic Trauma, 187 MED. J. AUSTL. 14,
14-17 (2007); and Ian Harris et al., Association Between Compensation Status and
Outcomes After Surgery: A Meta-Analysis, 293 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1644, 1644-52
(2005)). In their study, Jason Thompson and his coauthors surveyed 934 road-trauma
survivors to determine what variables might impact health outcomes in no-fault
compensation systems "where access to compensation, medical and rehabilitation
support is largely identical." Id. at 247. Their study finds that people in no-fault
personal injury systems who feel others are responsible for their injuries have poorer
post-accident outcomes than those who attribute responsibility to others. Id. at 247-
48, 252. Compare Thomson et al., supra, with Michael Fitzharris et al., The
Relationship Between Perceived Crash Responsibility and Post-Crash Depression, 49
PROC. Assoc. Av. AUTOMOT. MED. 79 (2005) (finding that perceiving oneself as
responsible for a crash is associated with higher rates of depression than when
responsibility is seen to be shared, and to a lesser extent, when responsibility is
attributed to another). Although Thomson et al. do not argue this conclusion, these
results suggest hat compensation alone is not sufficient to make injured parties whole,
particularly if it is perceived that someone else is responsible for their injuries. It is
unclear whether it would have made a difference to these people if the parties whom
they blamed suffered some consequence for their actions. However, it might be that
systems that focus more on the injury and less on fault will not be helpful to injured
parties. Further, that injured people's health outcomes might be tied to attributions of
responsibility underlines the importance of the responsibility problem when
autonomous machines are involved. But see Toby Handfield, Nozick, Prohibition, and
No-Fault Motor Insurance, 20 J. APPLIED PHIL. 201 (2003) (arguing on philosophical
grounds there is no prima facie reason to believe the compensation afforded in a no-
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2. Widening the Circle of Responsible Actors
Another alternative to an individualistic methodology for
attributing responsibility retains the concept of culpability but reaches
beyond the individual. In group responsibility, one approach is to cut
the Gordian knot of distributional problems by emphasizing the group
as the fundamental unit of concern. In a form of joint and several
liability, each member is responsible for group wrongdoing as a matter
of course, and each member's wrongdoing is attributed to each other
member. "[W]hen one member of a community commits a wrong
against a member of another, all members of the wrongdoer's
community are equally responsible for that wrong, for each member of
the community is an expression of its moral center."89
Other scholars suggest an intermediate step. F. Allan Hanson
makes the case for extended agencies. He begins with the fundamental
idea that moral responsibility for an act "lies with the subject that carried
it out."90 However, he points out that subjects are socially constructed
and that in some circumstances, it seems more appropriate to view the
subject as more than a human individual, particularly when technology
is involved. He builds on an instinct that a person driving a car is in
some sense different than the same person when she is riding a bicycle.
"[I]f an action can be accomplished only with the collusion of a variety
of human and nonhuman participants," he argues, "then the subject or
agency that carries out the action cannot be limited to the human
component but must consist of all of them."9 1 Hanson then makes the
case that an extended subject can be held morally responsible. First,
like Watson and Smith (although he does not use their terminology), he
distinguishes between a subject being responsible and a subject being
held responsible and argues it is relatively straightforward to find
extended subjects responsible for something in the former sense.92
fault scheme would be less adequate than that afforded by participation in a fault-based
system).
89 Reiff, supra note 53, at 227.
90 F. Allan Hanson, Beyond the Skin Bag: On the Moral Responsibility of Extended
Agencies, 11 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 91, 91 (2009). Bruno Latour makes similar
arguments. See Bruno Latour, On Technical Mediation, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 29
(1994).
91 Hanson, supra note 90, at 92.
92 Id. at 95.
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Second, he asserts extended subjects can be seen as meeting at least
some of the requirements normally required for moral responsibility for
humans. 93
With regard to awareness of the consequences and freedom of
choice, Hanson agrees these conditions would need to be met to hold
humans in an extended agency responsible, but points out awareness of
consequences and freedom are necessary but insufficient conditions for
responsibility. There must be some action as well, and humans often
are unable to act without other parts of the extended agency: "[g]iven
that moral responsibility cannot exist but for the action of the extended
agency, it lies with the extended agency as a whole and should not be
limited to any part of it." 94 He makes a similar case that extended
agencies can be said to have intentions and argues an extended agency
would be better at explaining causation than moral individualism; under
some circumstances it seems much more plausible to say that an
extended agency of humans and technology caused an event rather than
the humans alone.95 Finally, in Hanson's view, extended agency does a
better job of explaining why a person's responsibilities increase when
she moves from riding a bicycle, to driving a car, and then to being
president of the United States with the codes to the nuclear arsenal.96
Given the difficulties we see in efforts to extend responsibility
from machines to humans, it seems understandable why there have been
other attempts to look beyond the human individual and to focus on
extended subjects that include human beings and machines. Hansen's
argument for extended agency is part of a strand of the philosophy of
technology that posits the human person is being transformed by
sophisticated technology that increases the human person's capacities
in some ways hitherto not dreamed of and limits it in others.97
Technology is becoming more sophisticated and more ubiquitous.
93 Mark Coeckelbergh takes an analogous approach. See Mark Coeckelbergh, Is Ethics
ofRobotics about Robots? Philosophy ofRobotics Beyond Realism and Individualism,
3 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 241, 247 (2011).
94 Hanson, supra note 90, at 96.
95 Id. at 96-97.
96 Id. at 97-98.
97 "The person who surrenders her glasses, her telephone, her car, and her computer
changes not only her instrumental abilities, but also her social life." BALKIN, supra
note 5, at 24-25.
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Perhaps parts of society will recognize that humans and machines are in
a symbiotic relationship in which one cannot do without the other, so
that we will become more comfortable with the idea that our
subjectivities are part of a larger whole. If a machine with which I am
associated causes harm, even though I did not personally intend that
harm, I might not feel it unfair I be held responsible for it.
However, there are several challenges to this approach. One
difficulty goes to the distinction discussed earlier between being
responsible and being held responsible. It might seem fair to be
considered responsible for harm in the sense that I and the machine
constituted an extended agent that caused that harm. However, if we
hold that extended agency responsible, then the fairness issues Watson
identifies become relevant. The distributional issues that vex group
responsibility arise again. An extended agency could be responsible for
harm, but even if my subjectivity is so enmeshed in that agency that it
is part of my identity, I, not the machine, will feel the negative
consequences of being held responsible. I might view those
consequences as unfair, particularly if I could not have reasonably
foreseen that the machine involved would cause harm, a machine over
which I ultimately had no control.
A second issue is analogous to the second question with which
group responsibility wrestles: what kinds of groups can be subject to
moral evaluation? Under an extended agency theory, an individual is
part of a number of such agencies throughout the course of a day: when
he steps in a car, when he sits at a computer terminal at work, whenever
he 'uses' technology to perform a particular task. Thus, how closely
tied to the agency must an individual be before he is considered part of
it? Sometimes the extended agency that causes harm will be persistent,
such as when a person regularly uses an autonomous car. At other times
it will be almost ephemeral, even though the harm caused by such an
agency is significant. That harm has occurred could by itself justify
liability and distributing it among members of the extended agency. If,
however, the agent is ephemeral, it will be tempting to fall back to more
traditional, human-only agent analysis, even though under Hanson's
framework, it was the extended agent that caused the harm.
The next Part discusses other attempts to redefine responsibility
but in a different context: whether robots are deserving of moral
concern. These efforts are all subject to the same criticism: the
sophistication of autonomous machines and their ubiquity might lead
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humans to fundamentally reconsider their moral frameworks and the
role the human individual plays in ethics and in legal responsibility.
However, in my view, such beliefs seem so fundamental that any
changes will happen at the margins. If so, as discussed in Part II.C.3, it
would seem Sparrow and other commentators are correct that there is a
responsibility gap between our current understandings of responsibility
and emerging technology and that such a gap is likely to persist.
IV. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MACHINE DESIGN
The exploration of how one might widen the scope of
associational responsibility and the sense that a gap in responsibility is
being created is accompanied by early forays into the legal
responsibility of the autonomous machines themselves. At this point,
such ideas seem farfetched. As discussed, machines are not cognizant
of the law, far less do they 'appreciate' or 'value' it. However, as
discussed below, engineers and commentators are giving serious
thought to changing this point. The idea is to create machines with
prosocial behaviors to minimize the possibility of harm and in the case
of the most sophisticated of machines, to make machines themselves
cognizant of their responsibilities to others, and to make them more
susceptible to forms of punishment. This development is being done to
make the machine itself more pliable and to make it more acceptable to
human beings to hold the machine itself responsible when it causes harm
and no recourse is available to another human being or organization.
Other commentators have recommended giving serious thought to
giving autonomous machines a kind of legal status, irrespective of
whether they reach levels of true autonomy. This Part evaluates
attempts to do so and their potential impacts.
A. Programming Law-Abiding and Ethical Machines
1. Rote Compliance with Law
At present, the most straightforward strategy is to program
machines to act as much as possible in conformity to existing law, for
example, by instructing autonomous cars to obey traffic laws or
autonomous weapons to follow the laws of war. Here, existing products
liability law, contract law, and the laws of war already impact machine
design. However, programming machines to obey the law is possible
only to a certain extent: law cannot always be reduced to a set of rules
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of decision. For example, with regard to autonomous weapons, Patick
Lin, George Bekey, and Keith Abney identify three reasons why what
they term "operational morality" (essentially the doctrines of the law of
war) alone will not insure compliance with the norms set out in the law.
98 First, weapons systems will become more autonomous. Second,
intelligent systems will encounter complexities in the environment their
designers could not anticipate, or they will be deployed in environments
in which they were not intended to operate. Third, the technology itself
will be complex, making it hard for systems engineers to predict how
systems will behave when confronted with new information.9 9 To build
on these points, many of the legal issues involving autonomous
machines will be retrospective in nature: we will need to determine
whether something a machine has already done has legal significance.
Ex ante programing will not always assist such ex post evaluations.
Since programming a system to follow the law by rote will be
insufficient in some instances, over the long term, the push will be for
machines at the highest level of autonomy to be programmed so they
are 'motivated' to engage in the kinds of prosocial behaviors the law is
designed to promote.
2. The Debate on Autonomous Moral Agency
As an initial matter, it should be pointed out there is still a debate
over whether it is possible to design moral machines. In a recent article
for example, Patrick Hew argues artificial moral agents are infeasible
given foreseeable technologies.10 0 He begins with the Aristotelian view
discussed earlier that a moral agent is one whose actions are subject to
blame or praise and that such action is not morally blameworthy or
praiseworthy unless it is voluntary.101 Hew links these principles to a
simple definition of intelligence: "anything that can close a loop from
sensors to effectors without human intervention."102 Hew points out a
mouse trap would meet this definition of intelligence, yet we do not
98 Patrick Lin et al., Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group, Autonomous Military
Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design (2008), at 26,
http://ethics.calpoly.edu/onrjreport.pdf.
99 Id.
100 Patrick Chisan Hew, Artificial Moral Agents are Infeasible with Foreseeable
Technologies, 16 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 197, 197 (2014).
101 Id. at 199.
102 Id. at 198.
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view a mousetrap as a moral agent because, although it can close the
loop between sensing and then trapping the mouse by itself, humans
external to the mousetrap engineered its operative 'rules.' He then
surveys technologies that are now being used in the area of artificial
intelligence and argues that each one of them requires a human being
outside of the intelligent system to supply its rules. 103 For Hew, this
means actions taken by such systems are not voluntary; hence, they are
not subject to moral blame or praise. Any blame or praise goes to the
humans who supplied the rules for the system.
Hew's argument is reminiscent of the arguments related to
physical or deistic determinism discussed in Part II and in a sense, is
unanswerable. Earlier, I pointed out that the realities of modern
software development and engineering would make it hard to attribute
responsibility for machine-caused harm to any one person. Hew's point
goes to another aspect of that issue: even if we use the corporation for
whom the software developers and engineers work as the primary locus
of responsibility, does it make a difference whether the system which
has caused the harm is one generation removed from the corporate
manufacturer or ten generations away? Hew believes it does not. 104
Others, however, argue machines will reach such high enough
levels of autonomy and sophistication that it will be hard to trace lines
of responsibility back to a set of human beings. Andreas Matthias
103 Id. at 198-200. These technologies are: self-replicating programs, self-modifying
code, machine learning systems, self-regulating adaptive systems and meta-adaptive
systems, self-organizing systems, and evolutionary computing. Id.
Hew concedes that "connectionist" approaches to artificial intelligence, such as
neural networks, provide enough true autonomy to qualify an intelligent system as an
agent whose actions are subject to blame or praise:
[C]onnectionist systems are characterized by units interacting via weighted
connections, where a unit's state is determined by inputs received from other
units .... The opportunity is for unit states to define the rules used by other
units. In this way, the connectionist system as a whole could come to supply
its own rules.
Id. at 200. However, Hew believes that if the weights in a neural network system are
provided by human beings, then the machine no longer qualifies as being autonomous.
Id.
1 Hew, supra note 100, at 201.
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discusses three examples of how this is so. 105 In one example, an
advanced Mars explorer is programmed to learn to avoid obstacles and
navigate on its own by retaining images of terrain and information about
how easy or hard it was to traverse so that the rover will act
appropriately the next time it encounters similar terrain. Matthias
argues if the rover falls into a hole, no one can be blamed: the operator
on Earth did not give any manual controls and the programmer can point
out the algorithm used was correctly implemented. The decision to
move forward was based on facts about the planetary terrain that were
encountered only after the rover had landed:
The actual decisions of the control program were based
not only on preprogrammed data, but on facts that were
added to the machine's database only after it reached the
surface of Mars: they are not part of the initial program,
but constitute genuine experience acquired
autonomously by the machine in the course of its
operation. 106
Matthias' illustration shows how the sophistication of machines
could make it difficult to attribute accidents caused by the machine to
humans. Lawrence Solum gives another example that forms a different
response to Hew, which has to do with framing. In a well-known and
prescient article written 20 years ago, Solum asks whether an electronic
trustee could be given legal personhood.107 He points out an electronic
trustee could be designed to delegate certain decisions to a human
trustee, which creates an argument that the human trustee is the 'real'
trustee.108 It follows that "the backup trustee must be the real trustee
because there is a pragmatic need for discretionary decision making."109
Solum, however, responds as follows:
The objection that the Al is not the real trustee seems to
rest on the possibility that a human backup will be
needed. But it is also possible that an Al administering
105 Matthias, supra note 32, at 176.
106 Id.
107 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhoodfor Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1231 (1992).
10s Id. at 1253.
109 Id. at 1254.
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many thousands of trusts would need to turn over
discretionary decisions to a natural person in only a few
cases-perhaps none. What is the point of saying that in
all of the thousands of trusts the Al handles by itself, the
real trustee was some natural person on whom the Al
would have called if a discretionary judgment had been
required? Doesn't it seem strange to say that the real
trustee is this unidentified natural person, who has had
no contact with the trust? Isn't it more natural to say that
the trustee was the Al, which holds title to the trust
property, makes the investment decisions, writes the
checks, and so forth? Even in the event that a human was
substituted, I think that we would be inclined to say
something like, "The Al was the trustee until June 7, then
a human took over."1 10
One can take the illustration a step further. Suppose the electronic
trustee commits a mistake that would be considered malpractice. Hew
would conceivably hold the human trustee or the designers of the
electronic trustee responsible for the wrong,"' but if the electronic
trustee has handled thousands to trusts by itself without mishap, it seems
somewhat strained to hold the human trustee responsible the one time a
mishap occurs.
3. Moral Machines, Susceptible to Punishment
Whether or not machines will be able to achieve 'true'
intelligence and autonomy, there is a body of scholarship that is
exploring how machines might be programmed to have prosocial
behaviors and thus be more law-abiding.112 For example, Lin, Bekey,
and Abney believe it will be impossible to program autonomous
weapons systems to always comply with the law of war. Consequently,
such machines will need to be programmed to engage in rough forms of
110 Id.
III Hew, supra note 100, at 201.
112 In 2014, the U.S. Office of Naval Research offered a $7.5 million grant to a research
team to develop robots to engage in moral reasoning. Nayef Al-Rodhan, The Moral
Code: How to Teach Robots Right and Wrong, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 12, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.conarticles/2015-08-12/moral-code.
Vol. 20 VIRGINIAJOURNAL OF LAW & No. 02
TECHNOLOGY
2016 Chinen, The Co-Evolution ofAutonomous 383
Machines and Legal Responsibiiy
moral reasoning.113  As Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen put it,
"[m] oral agents monitor and regulate their behavior in light of the harms
their actions may cause or the duties they neglect. Humans should
expect nothing less of [autonomous moral agents]."1 14 Both sets of
authors recommend a hybrid approach, whereby machines will be given
"top-down," deontological ethical rules, such as Asimov's three laws of
robotics, or Kant's categorical imperative. The top-down approach has
the advantage of providing rules that can apply in many situations but
has the weakness of being too vague.115 Thus, such machines should
also be programmed to engage in "bottom-up" learning behaviors,
whereby the rules of behavior will be able to evolve as machines are
faced with specific situations. 116 For Wallach and Allen, the hybrid
approach comes near to instilling a kind of virtue ethics in robots.117
Such approaches of course are enormously challenging and raise
their own issues of responsibility. As Keith Abney points out, the
attempt to program morality into robots highlights unanswered
questions about competing ethical approaches.11 8 The classic Trolley
Problem first discussed by Philippa Foot has been cited as raising this
problem. A trolley is running out of control down a track where five
people are at work unaware of the danger. An observer stands at a
switch that can direct the trolley down another track, but there is another
113 Lin et al., supra note 98, at 27-41.
114 WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 59, at 16. Wallach also points out if robots are
able to address ethical issues, new markets for robots will open up. In contrast, "if
they fail to adequately accommodate human laws and values, there will be demands
for regulations that limit their use." Wendell Wallach, From Robots to Techno
Sapiens: Ethics, Law and Public Policy in the Development of Robotics and
Neurotechnologies, 3 LAW INNOV. & TECH. 185, 196 (2011). See also Kenneth
Kernaghan, The Rights and Wrongs of Robotics: Ethics and Robots in Public
Organizations, 57 CANADIAN PUB. ADMIN. 485, 485 (2014) (arguing for the
development of robots that follow ethical standards of personal moral responsibility,
privacy, and accountability as robots become more commonplace in the areas of aging,
public health, and defense).
115 Lin et al., supra note 98, at 34.
116 Id. at 41.
117 WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 59, at 117-24. The authors refer to studies that
have discussed how neural network programming resonates with Aristotle's
explanation of how people develop virtues. Id. at 121-23.
". Keith Abney, Robotics, Ethical Theory, and Metaethics: A Guide for the Perplexed,
in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS, 35, 41-45
(Patrick Lin et al., eds., 2011).
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person at the end of that section track. The observer has the choice of
doing nothing and allowing five people to be killed or throwing the
switch with the result that one person will die.1 19 Research based on the
Trolley Problem has led Joshua Greene to conclude that human beings
tend to motivated by both utilitarian and deontological ethical
impulses.120 Most people will choose to turn the switch, but the answer
will vary if changes are made to the scenario, for example, if the five
workers are adults and the one person is a child. 121 For the computer
programmer, one issue is whether autonomous machines can be
programmed to engage in finely tuned moral reasoning, even if in the
end, there will be no right answer to the dilemma.122 The designer will
be forced to resolve the dilemma one way or the other, and an issue is
whether he or she can be held responsible for doing so.123
119 See WALLACH & ALLEN, supra note 59, at 13-16; Nick Belay, Robot Ethics and
Self-Driving Cars: How Ethical Determinations in Software will Require a New Legal
Framework, 40 J. LEGAL. PROF. 119, 120 (2015).
120 JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP BETWEEN US
AND THEM 113-28 (2013).
121 Belay, supra note 119, at 120-21.
122 In Wallach's view, designing machines to engage in moral decision making
encompasses two problems:
The first problem entails finding a computational method to
implement norms, rules, principles or procedures for making moral
judgements. The second is a group of related challenges that I refer
to as frame problems. How does the system recognise that it is in an
ethically significant situation? How does it discern essential from
inessential information? How does the AMA estimate the
sufficiency of initial information? What capabilities would an AMA
require to make a valid judgement about a complex situation, eg,
combatants vs. non-combatants? How ould the system recognise
that it had applied all necessary considerations to the challenge at
hand or completed its determination of the appropriate action to
take?
Wallach, supra note 114, at 200. For a discussion of how ethical control could be
inserted into autonomous weapons systems, see Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal
Behavior: Embedding Ethics in a Hybrid Deliberative/Reactive Robot Architecture,
Georgia Institute of Technology Technical Report GIT-GVU-07-11 (2007), at 14-21,
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/formalizationv35.pdf.
123 Belay, supra note 119, at 122-29. In an interesting study, Peter Danielson used a
survey platform to seek responses to an autonomous machine version of the Trolley
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Other literature is exploring ways in which machines can be
made more amenable to punishment. As is true with other aspects of
responsibility for autonomous machines, the question of punishment
involves articulating the reasons for sanctions, whether new forms of
punishment must be designed, and whether they would be technically
feasible. J. Storrs Hall believes the deterrent function of punishment
can be programmed into machines to influence behavior: "[i]n the
rational machine . . . a credible threat of punishment (or reward) will be
added to calculated utility of the predicted outcome of the act." 124 Asaro
responds in part by arguing that Hall's deterrence approach fails to
Problem. Peter Danielson, Surprising Judgments about Robot Drivers: Experiments
on Raising Expectations and Blaming Humans, 9 NORDIC J. APPLIED ETHICS 73
(2015). In this variation a train is being operated by a robot, which must decide
between killing five people or turning to another track and killing one. Danielson
acknowledges there are methodological issues with the study, but his results suggest
people view the problem differently when a machine is involved. In another study,
90% of respondents answered that a human should divert the train. Id. at 78, citing
John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11
COGNITIVE SCI. 143 (2007). However, in Daniel's study, only 37% agreed that the
robot should divert the train, and more chose to be neutral rather than resolve the
dilemma. Many expected the automated system to eliminate these kinds of problems.
Id. at 78. More interesting, however, a surprising number of respondents blamed the
victims in the problem for being on the track in the first place. Id. at 79. When a
human was involved, no such blaming took place. Id. at 80. Finally, respondents were
asked to respond to a situation when a child steps in front of a driverless car in a
situation where it is physically impossible to stop the car. Most respondents found
that the parents, the child, or the maker of the care should be held responsible. Id.
This situation is an example of machines 'embodying' the ethical dilemmas with
which humans wrestle and resolving them. The human response to machines resolving
that dilemma is unexpected.
1 J. Storrs Hall, Towards Machine Agency: A Philosophical and Technological
Roadmap, "We Robot" Conference at the University of Miami Law School (Mar. 30,
2012), at 4, http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/0 1 Hall-
MachineAgencyLong.pdf. Hall uses an example where a robot is in a situation in
which there are two alternatives: to pick up a $5 bill or a $10 bill. Its utility function
is the amount of money it has. It will pick up the $10. If we want the robot to pick up
the $5 bill instead, the robot can be threatened with a $6 fine for picking up the $10
bill. The robot will then pick it up the $5 since it will net only $4 if it picks up the $10
bill. Id. Suppose the robot is given the choice between being placed in a situation where
it can choose unencumbered or having its utility function changed so that the robot
will prefer to pick up the $5 instead of $10. Id. It will choose the former because under
its present utility function it will prefer to make $10. Id. Hall presumably uses the
latter illustration to show that the threat of punishment in the form of changing a utility
function can influence robot behavior.
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encompass other reasons for punishment, such as retribution, deterrence
that goes beyond the individual to the larger society, and reform.125
Although Asaro himself does not suggest an alternative form of
punishment, others have pointed to alternatives such as confining a
robot to a particular part of cyberspace, deleting an autonomous
machine's computer systems without backup, or banning a system from
being used.126  Sparrow, however, doubts that various forms of
punishment will ever be completely satisfactory because in his view,
punishment entails suffering. 127 This view raises another issue: whether
it is ethical to design something that is capable of feeling something
analogous to pain.
B. Autonomous Machines Having Legal Status or
Personhood
The preceding subpart indicates some of the difficulties involved
with programing ethical machines, which challenge current
understandings of human consciousness, free will, etc. Law can avoid
many of these issues since autonomous machines could be given legal
status without answering these almost metaphysical questions. As
discussed above, Chopra and White argue agency should be used to
address harms caused by autonomous machines. With products
liability, in their view, it would be useful to hold autonomous machines
liable themselves, in part because they believe it will be difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed under current products liability law.128 Similarly,
Pagallo suggests giving legal personhood to computer-based
contracting systems to better justify holding contracts made by such
systems enforceable.129 The law could devise ways to create economic
consequences for holding an autonomous machine responsible for
harms, such as a minimum capital requirement associated with the
125 Peter A. Asaro, Punishment, Reinforcement Learning & Machine Agency,
COSMOPOLIS (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.cosnopolis.globalist.it/DetailNewsDisplay?ID=69610.
126 Pagallo, supra note 30 at 56 (confinement and deletion); Bernd Carsten Stahl,
Responsible Computers? A Case for Ascribing Quasi-Responsibility to Computers
Independent of Personhood or Agency, 8 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 205, 211 (2006)
(banning).
127 Sparrow, supra note 27, at 72.
128 CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 143-144.
129 PAGALLO, supra note 9, at 154.
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machine; keeping a register that accounts for damage caused by a
machine, presumably to be paid by its owner, operator, or some
common fund; or using respondeat superior to hold a principal liable
for what the machine has done.130 Similarly, Lawrence Solum points
out a computer agent could purchase insurance against the risk of its
own misfeasance. 131
Proponents of granting legal status or personhood to
autonomous machines argue giving legal personhood to things is not
new. Ships and corporations enjoy status as legal persons and assume
liabilities. Chopra and White argue in several cases actions, not mental
states, are important in determining legal liability. Further, they urge,
mental states and intentionality are themselves constructions, which are
used to determine when the same action is subject to legal sanctions and
when it is not.132 They also contend it is a categorical mistake to equate
legal responsibility with moral responsibility-there is no need in their
view to satisfy all the criteria for holding a robot morally responsible for
something before it can be found legally responsible.133
Granting legal status to autonomous systems does have the
advantages just discussed. At he same time, the mere grant of legal
status does not resolve all moral issues. Some remarks by Mireille
Hildebrant are interesting in this regard. Hildebrant agrees granting
legal personhood to robots has less to do with recognizing something
innate in the machine than with the consequences that follow from
130 Id. at 103-106; CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 150. It is unclear, however,
whether such a response resolves the distributional problems posed by group
responsibility. Unless autonomous machines are allowed to generate and retain their
own income (a quasi-property right enjoyed by those machines), the funds used to
satisfy third party claims would have to come from some human entity or group. Of
course, if that group is a corporation, it could be argued that although shareholders
would see less dividends, it is not inappropriate that ultimate responsibility would rest
with them, since they benefit from the corporation's use of the machine.
131 Solum, supra note 107, at 1245. He uses this experiment in response to a claim
that an artificial intelligence could not be considered a legal person because it could
not be held responsible in the sense of satisfying legal claims brought against it. Id.
Solum acknowledges that insurance might not be available in all cases, leaving the
artificial trustee unpunished. In his view, however, whether that disqualifies the
trustee from being given legal personhood status depends in part on the purpose of
punishment. Id. at 1245-47.
132 CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 146.
133 Id. at 147.
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granting such status.134 She states that "moral agency is not necessarily
the golden standard of personhood; if entities without such agency cause
damage or harm it may be expedient and even justified to hold them
accountable."135 For Hildebrant, what warrants granting personhood is
fairness to injured parties and to other perpetrators; "[t]he justification
would reside in the ensuing obligation to compensate the damage or to
contribute to the mitigation of the harm (justice done to the victim), but
also in the fairness of the distribution of liability (justice in relation to
other offenders)."136  This argument implies that current forms of
associative responsibility and their distribution among members of
groups cannot adequately address situations when harm results from
humans and machines working together, unless some kind of status is
given to the machines themselves.
A combination of pragmatics and ethical quandaries about
attributing responsibility by association could lead to the 'solution' of
granting legal status to autonomous machines. The question then
becomes whether such machines should be granted legal rights in
addition to duties. The debate is remarkable in several respects. One
reason is that it exists at all. Most of us do not think of machines as
enjoying rights. Another reason is it highlights some of the conceptual
difficulties that underlie them. On the one hand, conferring rights on
machines would seem to confirm a positivistic, constructive
understanding of rights. This understanding of course raises the issue
whether such rights can then be taken away. On the other hand,
proponents of inherent rights could argue truly autonomous machines
must possess some quality, such as intelligence, that it shares with
humans who enjoy rights. However, this argument raises the problem
of essentialism: identifying what makes human beings rights-bearing
persons. Assuming this quality can be identified, it raises the issue
134 Mireille Hildebrandt, From Galatea 2.2 to Watson And Back? in HUMAN LAW
AND COMPUTER LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, 25 JUS GENTIUM 23, 38
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer, eds., 2013). In this regard, Bernd Stahl uses
the distinctions between various forms of responsibility identified by scholars such as
Watson and Smith discussed in Part II.C to argue robots can be assigned responsibility
to further certain social ends. Bernd Carsten Stahl, Responsible Computers? A Case
for Ascribing Quasi-Responsibility to Computers Independent of Personhood or
Agency, 8 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 205, 210-11 (2006).
135 Hildebrant, supra note 134, at 38.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
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whether rights should be given to all entities that share it. 137 A third
issue is how older concepts of hierarchy and status are being used to
frame the problem. It could be argued intelligent machines should not
be given rights because machines are like animals or children, beings
with diminished capacities who do not enjoy the full rights of adult
humans for that reason.138 Commentators have also used slave law to
discuss how human 'masters' might be held responsible for the actions
of robot 'slaves'139 and to discuss why autonomous machines should not
enjoy the same rights as humans.140
The moral concerns raised by this third feature of the debate over
rights for machines, combined with the tendency of humans to
anthropomorphize machines14 1 and efforts to program computers to be
emotionally intelligent in their interactions with human beings,142 might
finally lead to arguments that the most highly sophisticated machines
are owed moral consideration. For Sparrow this is a very high bar. He
posits a moral "Turing test" such that robots would merit full moral
status only when robots display properties o that it would be difficult
to choose between the life of a human being and the existence of the
autonomous machine.143 David Gunkel, however, evaluates other ways
137 For a discussion of these problems, see Solum, supra note 107 at 1262-74.
138 Asaro, A Body to Kick, supra note 16, at 178.
139 See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 10, at 134; Lin et al., supra note 98, at 66.
140 Asaro, A Body to Kick, supra note 16, at 178; Solum, supra note 107, at 1279
(criticizing the slave argument).
141 Mark Coeckelbergh argues in this regard that we anthropomorphize robots as part
of a hermeneutic through which we view robots as individuals. Mark Coeckelbergh,
Is Ethics of Robots About Robots? Philosophy of Robotics Beyond Realism and
Individualism, 3 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 241, 244 (2011).
142 See Brian R. Duffy, Anthropomorphism and the Social Robot, 42 ROBOTICS &
AUTONOMOUS SYS. 177 (2003) (arguing the tendency to anthropomorphize will
actually assist in developing machines that enhance meaningful interactions with
humans). For an example of how some robots are designed to elicit emotional
responses in humans, see Eun Ho Kim et al., Design and Development ofan Emotional
Interaction Robot, Mung, 23 ADVANCED ROBOTICS 767 (2009) (describing a robot
designed to emulate bruising); Hawon Lee & Eunja Hyun, The Intelligent Robot
Contents for Children with Speech-Language Disorder, 18 EDUC. TECH. & SOC'Y 100
(2015) (describing a robot used to work with children with speech and language
disabilities).
143 Robert Sparrow, The Turing Triage Test, 6 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 203 (2004); Robert
Sparrow, Can Machines Be People? Reflections on the Turing Triage Test, in ROBOT
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of framing the issue. He describes work drawn from the animal rights
and environmental rights movements to explore whether machines
might be entitled to moral patiency. This approach is not concerned
with whether someone or something has moral agency with rights and
responsibilities, but asks instead whether that entity can suffer.144
Gunkel cites the work of Lucian Floridi, who argues that information is
the common denominator between animals, the environment, and
computers: "[w]hat makes someone or something else a moral patient,
deserving of some level of ethical consideration (no matter how
minimal), is that it exists as a coherent body of information."145 Under
this view, the loss of information, a form of informational entropy, is
analogous to suffering.146 Gunkel himself is critical of this approach
because in his view, finding a common denominator between humans
and other entities to justify giving moral regard to nonhumans is a form
of essentializing that does violence to differences in the individuals that
are part of the group and excludes others.147 He therefore explores an
ethic based on concern for the other drawn from a variety of scholars
influenced by Levinas14 8 so that the machine is included among those
others that demand moral consideration. However, for Gunkel, this
approach is also flawed because it falls back on a kind of exclusion in
which machines are always left out.14 9 For Gunkel, the question
whether machines should be given moral consideration is not one that
can ultimately be answered, rather one that should constantly be asked
because of the light it sheds on our conceptions of ethics.15 0
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with Asaro's call for theories of
responsibility that can address large, complex systems of human beings
and machines working together, so those systems will yield desirable
ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS, 301, 301 (Patrick Lin
et. al. eds., 2012).
144 DAVID J. GUNKEL, THE MACHINE QUESTION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AI,
ROBOTS, AND ETHICS 93-157 (2012).
145 Id. at 146.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 157.
148 Id. at 177.
149 Id. at 206-07.
150 Id. at 211.
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outcomes and can be held responsible when the results are otherwise. I
have responded by setting out a possible trajectory for the co-evolution
of legal responsibility and autonomous machines. Commentators are
using pre-existing legal doctrines related to defective products, agency
law, and international humanitarian law. They debate the extent to
which those doctrines in their current forms can address situations that
will arise when autonomous machines become more common. If
existing law does not provide satisfactory solutions, it is because of the
law's general discomfort with associative responsibility, a discomfort
that is shared and supported by most of the literature on ethics. The
ethical literature most relevant to the problems of associative
responsibility provides some guidance on the issue, but no completely
satisfactory answers. In turn, the concern there will be gaps in
responsibility for harms caused by machines leads to two lines of
development. The first is refining or redefining the concept of
responsibility. The second is to reduce harm by designing autonomous
machines with prosocial behaviors. If successful, that very success,
combined with calls to grant legal personhood to machines for legal and
pragmatic reasons and the human tendency to anthropomorphize, will
strengthen what are now nascent calls to treat such machines as moral
agents.
To what extent does tracing a possible co-evolutionary trajectory
respond to Asaro's call? To answer that question, it is helpful to toggle
back and forth between various points in that trajectory. At the end
point, a world in which humans and machines who enjoy equal legal
status and rights would of course be radically different: for the first time
in human history, we would co-exist with nonhuman intelligences who
are our equals (and perhaps our superiors) in significant ways. We will
have created our own alien 'life.' However, there is a sense in which
we could use our current systems of legal responsibility without much
controversy: the autonomous machine would be treated like any other
individual who lives and works in large systems.
Asaro's challenge can thus be reframed: how well do our legal
doctrines address harms caused by complex systems of humans now,
with or without machines? I have discussed that latter question to some
extent in Part II. A complete answer to that question might be a matter
of the glass being half empty or half full. The debates surrounding tort
reform serve as an example. In a 1994 meta-study, Gary Schwartz
surveyed then-existing assessments of the impact of tort law in a wide
area of economic sectors and concluded there was "evidence
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persuasively showing that tort law achieves something significant in
encouraging safety."15 1 However, the impact of tort law can sometimes
be ambiguous or of lesser importance than other factors. A study by
Paul Rubin, for example, indicates that consumer preferences for safer
products are the primary drivers of improvements in safety. In his view,
regulation and tort law can also contribute to safety improvements.
However, because tort law is an expensive means of encouraging safety,
it might actually increase risk by causing people to forgo things such as
drugs and medical treatments because they are made more expensive by
costs incurred to avoid tort liability. 152
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the effectiveness
of tort law, but for our purposes, it is enough to repeat what was
discussed earlier: the law already purports to address large systems.
Assessing how effective the law is in regulating those systems does not
require us to take autonomous machines into account. However, this is
not to say autonomous machines are irrelevant. The extent to which they
do become relevant will depend on how deeply societies want to
penetrate complex systems to hold parts of those systems responsible
for harms. In this regard, Wallach points out that the investigation of
the Challenger disaster demonstrates how hard it is to determine who or
what is to blame for the failure of a complex system such as the space
shuttle, that in turn is a product of complex organizations like large
corporations. 153 It is only if society feels it is necessary to become finer
grained in assigning responsibility to move from the corporations who
manufactured and designed the components and software used in the
shuttle to individual designers and engineers who could be said to have
contributed to the defects that led to that disaster, as well those along
the chain of command that ordered the launch to go forward, that the
problems of associational responsibility discussed in this Article
become more salient. Autonomous machines then would become part
of the calculus, if by that time their decision-making capacity is so
sophisticated that it will be hard to attribute responsibility for harms
they cause to their coworkers, supervisors, or those who designed them,
15 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 423 (1994-1995).
152 Paul H. Rubin, Markets, Tort Law, and Regulation to Achieve Safety, 31 CATo J.
217, 231-32 (2011). Rubin argues that tort reform from 1981 to 2000 led to 24,000
fewer accidental deaths because of increased emergency medical care. Id.
153 Wallach, supra note 114, at 194-95.
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but at the same time, they are not autonomous enough to merit legal, let
alone moral, agency so that they can be blamed directly for what they
have done.
At that point, prevailing ethical and legal views of responsibility
would need to be reevaluated. Part III has assessed possible ways
existing conceptions of responsibility might be modified to encompass
humans and machines. In my view, however, those modifications
require the creation of new or more abstract ethical and legal subjects
capable of bearing responsibility that will involve necessarily some
form of responsibility by association. Many of us will find that hard to
accept, although some change might be possible at the margins. This
view means the strategy of designing machines themselves with a view
towards harm reduction will be seen as more desirable, with the possible
implications discussed in Part IV. One of the ironies of that approach,
however, is that our aversion to sharing the responsibility of another
could lead to the development of machines that are in some senses
wholly other and in other senses wholly us.
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